This paper studies moral hazard where he agent alone observes the stochastic outcome of her action, which she reports to the principal. Therefore the principal also faces a problem of ex post adverse selection, for which an audit is required. Because the problem is not separable, the contract must resolve a fundamental tension between ex ante and ex post incentives. The Revelation Principle must be extended to obtain type separation. The optimal contract features two new frictions: (i ) the agent's ability to exaggerate her performance increases the cost of effort and (ii ) bounded penalties further increase that cost by rendering the transfer function option-like. A better audit relaxes both these frictions.
Introduction
In standard moral hazard models the outcome of the agent's action is observable by the principal and may therefore (imperfectly) substitute itself for the non-observability of said action. Then a complete, second-best contract can be conditioned on that observation. However performance may be difficult to observe, or its observation may be considerably delayed. Sometimes it is not observed at all: for example, an accounting report is not a direct observation of the state of a firm. * School of Economics, UNSW. Email: g.roger@unsw.edu.au. I thank Guido Friebel, Mike Peters, Ralph Winter, my colleagues Bill Schworm, Chris Bidner, Carlos Pimienta and Suraj Prasad, and Luis Vasconcelos for especially helpful comments. Financial support from the Australian School of Business at UNSW is gratefully acknowledged.
In this paper attention is paid to the case where the outcome realization is not observable by the principal, but must be reported by the agent. That information is subject to manipulation, hence it is said to be soft. Many practical situations fit this description. A board often asks of a CEO to report his (her) results while on the job. 1 A regulated firm may be asked to reveal its production costs after investing in an uncertain technology. At delivery, an IT project's outcome is typically better known by the supplier than the user.
In such instances the principal is exposed to ex ante moral hazard, and also faces a problem of adverse selection ex post. The object of this paper is to understand how these two problems interact in determining the optimal contract. Mookherjee and Png (1989) show that absent (institutional) constraints, the principal can find enough tools of sufficient potency to divorce the twin problem into an independent moral hazard problem and an independent adverse selection problem, i.e. the interaction is moot. The Revelation Principle can be applied, truthful revelation obtains and each of the moral hazard and adverse selection problems are solved in standard fashion.
Mookherjee and Png's contribution is technically flawless but may attract some objections.
First, the transfer (a reward) that is necessary to induce information revelation may be arbitrarily large; it turns the principal into a source of money regardless of the value of the productive relationship with the agent. Second, mechanisms of this kind are not observed in practice. Executive compensation contracts, for example, may specify a diverse array of contingent payments, but usually not a bonus for not misleading shareholders. Third, even if they were actually used, such contracts predict truthful revelation, which clearly contradicts the evidence. For example, Bally Total Fitness, a large chain of fitness clubs, fired its controller and treasurer, then its CFO, for misleading accounting in 2005. In 2004, Nortel terminated some executives for manipulating the accounts in order to pocket $13 million in boni. 2 More recently, Lehman engaged in the questionable (but clearly misleading) practice of "repo 105". 3 Thus a model that systematically predicts truthful revelation has limited applicability.
To move away from separability one needs a more parsimonious contract than the one constructed by Mookherjee and Png. In the present paper the principal is constrained in two ways: he can offer only one transfer and the penalties he can impose are exogenously bounded. This accords well with observation of real contracts; noticeably, common law does not enforce penalties in excess of the harm caused-penalties are de facto bounded (Cooter and Ulen, 2004) . With this the problem is no longer separable. The incentives used to solve the moral hazard problem interact with the adverse selection problem, and the information revelation problem affects the ex ante incentives.
The model mirrors a standard one, except that the principal does not observe the outcome.
Therefore the standard incentive contract must be augmented to include a revelation mechanism.
Because the principal otherwise observes nothing the mechanism must include an (imperfect) audit and penalties. At the heart of the problem lies a fundamental tension between ex ante effort provision-which requires a state-contingent compensation-and ex post information revelation, which is best addressed with a constant transfer. Attention is restricted to environments (i.e. audit technology and penalties) where the principal is the most disadvantaged; truthful revelation is never possible, so the conflict between ex ante and ex post incentives is the strongest. Not only is truthful revelation out of reach, a direct mechanism generates partial pooling. In this restricted environment, the main contribution of the paper is to construct a revelation mechanism that least interferes with the moral hazard problem. This mechanism is fully separating; it requires an extended, but simple, message space. This construction is useful in that a contact that induces separation always dominates one that relies on a direct mechanism because pooling hardens the moral hazard constraint.
With this revelation mechanism in hand the optimal transfer and action can be characterized.
Both are shown to be always lower than in the standard model, and thus for two reasons. First, for any transfer, the agent systematically distorts her message upwards, which inflates her expected utility in any state and thus hardens the moral hazard constraint. Effort and manipulation become substitutes. Second, bounded penalties imply a lower bound on transfers; they act like a limited liability constraint, which further increases the principal's cost of a high action. (Therefore rents arise.) The contract is option-like, as in Jewitt, Kadan and Swinkel (2008, now JKS). So the lack of separability yields very different results from those of Mookherjee and Png (1989) . Last, transfers are shown to increase with audit precision in that a better audit curtails message inflation, which relaxes the moral hazard constraint. For practitioners or policy-makers, these results suggest that offering ever more lucrative and responsive incentive schemes is counterproductive when information is subject to manipulation.
The work closest to this is Mookherjee and Png (1989) , who essentially study the same problem but let the principal use a transfer for each of the moral hazard and the adverse selection problem.
The latter is a (arbitrarily large) reward for truthful revelation if the agent is audited. This paper also relates to articles on the topic of optimal audit as Border and Sobel (1987) . These models rely on a perfect audit; both call on unlimited rewards for truth-telling, and so elicit truthful revelation. 4 (Unbounded rewards work like unbounded punishments.) Kanodia (1985) also combines a moral hazard problem with ex post adverse selection but imposes constant wages, which guarantees truthful revelation. Doornik (2006) studies the opposite problem: the principal only observes the output, and with that information may make a renegotiation offer to the agent.
This becomes a signaling game; although the agent is risk-neutral, no Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium can implement the first-best. The optimal contract is a one-step contract (because of risk-neutrality and limited liability). In this paper the equilibrium concept is subgame perfection and the contract is smooth, but as in Doornik (2006) it only pays above a performance threshold. Gromb and Martimort (2007) let (an) expert(s) search for information by exerting some effort, who then has (have) to disclose it to the principal. To overcome moral hazard the expert's contract must be made state-dependent. Like in this paper, this very fact introduces adverse selection.
However a contract can be conditioned on the final, publicly observable outcome, unlike here.
Malcomson (2009) studies a problem where the agent acquires soft information that may be used by the agent to make a decision yielding a verifiable outcome. The principal may have incentives to distort the decision rule away from the first-best to foster information acquisition. Levitt and Snyder (1997) develop a contracting model in which the agent receives an early (soft) signal about the likely success of the project. With appropriate early information, the principal can decide whether to shut-down or continue. To obtain this information, the principal must commit himself to shut-down less frequently than the unconstrained solution prescribes. The eventual outcome is fully observed by the principal, hence contractible. In all these papers, information is still exogenously given although ex ante unknown to the agent. Here the private information emerges endogenously.
JKS show a unique contract exists when the agent must receive a minimum payment regardless of the state (limited liability). They call the contract "option-like": it pays a constant wage below a threshold realization, and an increasing transfer beyond. In this paper bounded penalties act like a limited liability constraint and the contract takes a similar shape.
Green and Laffont (1986) study the principal-agent problem with "partially verifiable information". The agent's message is constrained to lie in an arbitrary, publicly known subset M (θ) of the type space Θ. 5 M (·)-implementable mechanisms exist and need not elicit truth-telling. The exogenous set M (θ) is derived endogenously here, as a best response on the part of the agent.
Deneckere and Severinov (2006) consider a similar problem but they endow the agent with a set of "verifying messages", which are available to the agent in some states only. These messages certify that the agent belongs to at most a subset of types. There is a sense in which the agent's optimal message is also verifying here in that it is invertible, but that message is the agent's only one.
Furthermore, the audit is the device the principal rely on to discipline messages and obtain type separation; in other words, it generates the set of "verifying messages". After introducing the model, Section 3 deals with the ex post information revelation problem.
Next the optimal contract is characterized and its properties are explored. Section 5 offers a discussion. The proofs and some of the technical material are relegated to the Appendix.
Model
A principal delegates a task to an agent, who undertakes an action a ∈ A ⊂ R + . The action's cost is c(a) increasing and convex, and yields a stochastic outcome θ ∈ [ θ, θ ] ≡ Θ ⊂ R with conditional distribution F (θ|a) and corresponding density f (θ|a) > 0. The density satisfies the
in a first-order sense when a ′ > a. I make the additional assumption that F a (F −1 (θ|a)) is convex in (θ, a). 6 The agent alone observes the outcome θ and reports a message ω ∈ Ω to the principal, At the stage of information revelation, effort is sunk so all that matters is the utility v(t(ω)). 
is a sorting condition on the ex post expected utility of the agent, akin to the Spence-Mirrlees condition. The timing is almost standard:
1. The principal offers a contract C = ⟨Ω, t(ω), p(ω − θ; α)⟩ made of a message space, a transfer function and an audit technology;
2. The agent accepts or rejects the contract. If accepting, she also chooses an action a;
3. Action a generates an outcome θ ∈ Θ observed by the agent only 8 ;
4. The agent reports a message ω ∈ Ω;
7 This formulation purposefully departs from the literature. It introduces a significant imperfection in the audit and is akin to a sampling process, as in Bushman and Kanodia (1996) . Financial audits are sampling processes. See also footnote 9.
8 That θ realizes does not imply that the payoff π(θ) is observed, as is the case in the accounting example. This is also true in Holmström and Milgrom (1987) or Bushman and Kanodia (1996) .
Audit occurs;
6. Transfers are implemented and payoffs are realized.
Information Revelation
This Section focuses on information transmission. It first shows that a direct mechanism necessarily induces partial pooling. A fully separating mechanism can be constructed by extending the agent's message space. The dependence on α is suppressed where convenient.
Preliminaries
Consider a general mechanism with message space Ω and suppose that the transfer function is increasing and a.e. differentiable. In short order it will be shown this is not a restriction. The
Given that t ′ ≥ 0 (and strictly for at least some messages), Condition (3.1) implies that any p(·) must be monotonically increasing for it to bind, hence the restriction to audit functions that satisfy this characteristic. For a mechanism to be truthful,
. Using (3.1), this is equivalent to there being someθ such that:
This equation states that truthful revelation depends on the precision p ′ (0) of the audit. Condition (3.2) is necessary and sufficient for truthful revelation atθ, which does not mean it holds for all values. In this paper attention is restricted to instances where (3.2) never holds. More precisely, I
consider cases where
that is, truthful revelation is impossible given the set of audit technologies and the penalties. 9 This restriction can be rationalized by conditions on the cost function k(α). More details are provided in the Appendix, Section 7.1. 
hence the need for rewards. Step function and information revelation.
Remark 1 An additional punishment may be inflicted to the agent up to some limited liability
and clearly there is less exaggeration in equilibrium. See also the Discussion for details.
Restricting t(·) to be a.e. differentiable deserves some comment. First, from Carlier and Dana (2005) we know that for the purpose of solving the moral hazard problem, any non-monotonic scheme is dominated by a monotone contract; that contract has to be (at least weakly) increasing to implement any effort. From (2.1) we also know that attention must be restricted to monotone transfers to separate agents. Therefore the transfer functions t(·) must be (at least weakly) increasing. Second, it is easy to see that a step function, for example, does not induce truthful revelation everywhere, in spite of being locally constant. 10 Consider any two levels of transfer t i , t i+1 . The marginal type θ i has incentives to send some message θ i + ϵ, ϵ → 0, at cost of order zero, and so do other types in the neighborhood. This is shown in Figure 1 . More precisely,
Lemma 1
The optimal transfer function cannot be discontinuous.
The proof makes it plain that this result follows from the continuity of p(·). 11 Because t(·) must be continuous and weakly increasing, it is a.e. differentiable. To conclude these preliminaries,
Lemma 2 A unique solution ω(t; θ) of (3.1) exists. Further,
, which induces truthful revelation. 11 It also formalizes the claim that a discontinuous (e.g. step) function cannot induce truthful revelation; simply take ω d = θ d and use the symmetry of p(·). See the proof.
∀θ, ω(θ, t) > θ;

∀θ < θ,
dω dθ > 0 a.e.; and
dt < 0 as well.
Limitations of Direct Revelation Mechanisms
This Section establishes that a DRM is not the best mechanism to use. Consider a mechanism
where Ω = Θ. By extension of Lemma 2 a solution exists. If the first-order condition (3.1) fails to bind, ω = θ necessarily. Combining this observation and Lemma 2,
The only instance where the direct mechanism is truthful is when θ = θ, because then the only message available to the agent is ω = θ. But the state θ is not the only instance in which this message is used. Messages are pooled for any type realization in the interval
because the upper bound of the type space Θ is also the upper bound of the message space under a direct mechanism. 12 This is depicted in Figure 2 (left panel). 13 Lemmata 2 and 3 may be interpreted as a failure of the Revelation Principle as we know it. It arises because of the lack of instruments available to the principal to induce truthful revelation. In standard problems, the principal can use both a transfer and an allocation to steer the agent toward truth-telling. In models without transfers, such as Melumad and Shibano (1991) or Martimort and Semenov (2006), the allocation distortion remains powerful enough an instrument to also elicit truthful messages. Here the principal faces essentially the opposite situation: he can offer a transfer but because of institutional constraints, he cannot distort the allocation sufficiently to compel truthful revelation. 14 At a minimum the consequence is that the principal cannot use 12 This resembles some of the results of Kartik (2009) where in a model of almost-cheap talk the sender inflates her messages at the low end of the type space and pools at the top end. 13 There may exist many kinds of contracts satisfying t ′ ≥ 0: some may include jumps, there may be intervals on which t ′ = 0 and so on, with implications for the message m(θ). It is therefore not obvious that m(θ) must be continuous, as it is depicted in Figure 1 . To see why, consider a transfer scheme t(·) that is flat on some range, say, on
may be steeper at θ2 than at θ1 and by (3.1), m(θ2) may jump from m(θ2 − ϵ), ϵ → 0. This will prove to not be a concern in equilibrium.
14 In Deneckere and Severinov (2006) the Revelation Principle fails because the set of verifying messages (a singleton for each type) may be too small compared to the set of optimal messages, which may not be single-valued. 
that information. It is in fact suboptimal altogether and the principal can do better with another mechanism. 
Proposition 1 Suppose there exists an optimal transfer function s
D : Θ ⊂ R → R
Separating mechanism
Since restricting the message space, as one does when working with a direct mechanism, induces pooling, I suggest to modestly expand it. Let M be an arbitrarily large message space such that Θ ⊂ M (and here M ⊂ R). Given a transfer function t, let for each θ:-
and define M = { m(θ; t) ∈ M| m solves (3.3) ∀θ ∈ Θ}. To simplify notation the dependence on t is suppressed: m(θ) ≡ m(θ; t). By extension of Lemma 2, m(θ) is unique, it exceeds the true state θ and increases in the state. The extent of the misrepresentation also decreases pointwise in the transfer t. The set M is the smallest message space necessary to deliver type separation; it is also all that's needed.
Lemma 4 There is no loss in restricting attention to simple message spaces M.
This could be dubbed the separation principle. The justification for insisting on separation is Proposition 1, which comes about because a DRM leads to partial pooling. To be clearer on this, consider a set M and transfer t( m(θ)). One can redefine the transfer function as t D ≡ t • m and
this is exactly where Condition (3.2) comes from. To draw an analogy to the standard adverse selection problem, the allocation distortion is insufficient. 15 
Optimal contract
The principal's gross payoff depends on the true state θ but the agent's transfer depends on the message m(θ) she sends, so both θ and m(θ) figure in the principal's net payoff-a fortiori in the program through the constraints. Because m(θ) is a single-valued function of θ, F (θ|a) is sufficient to describe the distribution of the agent's optimal messages. 16 The principal solves:-
The last two constraints are the standard participation and moral hazard constraints. The novelty of this paper is the introduction of the interim information-revelation constraint (4.1). Attach
Lagrange multipliers λ to (4.3) and µ to (4.2). The first-order necessary conditions of Problem 1 are given by:
15 This is where the commitment assumption is particularly important: when m > θ, these messages are still interpreted by the mechanism as being output levels although they are clearly a misreport. Absent this commitment separation cannot obtain. 16 In fact M and Θ are homeomorphic.
where m(θ) is determined by (4.1). 
Soft information and incentives
Introducing soft information alters the agent's incentives, and the principal's response, in several ways. The next claim speaks to the impact of misrepresentation on the incentives in Problem 1.
Denote byâ the action solving
Lemma 5 Fix the transfer function t across models.
• For a given transfer schedule the agent's moral hazard constraint is hardened. The reason is that her expected payoff is higher in any state thanks to message inflation, so the marginal benefit of effort is lower. In particular, very low outcomes are tempered by the option to exaggerate them; they do not provide strong incentives. For the agent, misreporting and exerting effort become substitutes. 17 Misrepresentation increases the principal's cost of any action, who prefers implementing a lower effort.
The interaction of the ex post problem with the provision of ex ante incentives also affects the form of the contract. This stems from the nature of the constraints of Problem 1. In the standard model the principal presents the agent with a transfer function of the form
where µ S , λ S are both strictly positive. For µ S > 0, the transfer schedule must contain both positive and negative elements (see Holmström, 1979 for example). In this model, given the penalty specified, the principal's reliance on the agent's messages for the implementation of transfers implies that the equilibrium transfers can only be positive. The agent can always do better than accepting a negative transfer. As Condition (3.1) states, she can simply take the lottery {p, 1 − p} over 0 and some positive v(t(m)) by exaggerating her message. So no message resulting in a negative transfer 17 Manipulation is costly in that the agent may be caught; so effort is a substitute for it.
will ever be sent, and no negative transfer will ever be implemented. The ex post adverse selection problem, together with the weak punishment, induce an implicit limited liability constraint. This necessarily implies a rent; indeed the agent could accept any contract ⟨t,ã,p⟩,ã > min a such that ∫ Θ v(t)dF (·|ã) − c(ã) = 0 but select a = min a at cost c(a) = 0 and receive an ex ante rent. A formal statement (Corollary 2) can be found in the Appendix, Section 7.3.
JKS study the consequences of imposing exogenous bounds on payments; their work is applicable to characterize the transfer function. For some action a there exists some θ a such that f a (θ a |a)/f (θ a |a) = 0. Directly from the preceding discussion, Lemma 6 Fix a. The optimal transfer t SB takes the form
where
and m(θ) solves (4.1). Furthermore, the multiplier λ of the moral hazard constraint (4.3) is strictly positive.
JKS call this kind of scheme option contracts. The constant κ corresponds to the minimum payment the agent must receive ex post.
To contrast some properties of the contract with the problem we all know, let t S and a S denote the denote the solutions of the standard moral hazard problem. Define both t S , t SB over M, i.e.
t SB : M → R; t S : M → R. The next result outlines the incentive properties of a transfer of the shape described by Lemma 6.
Lemma 7 Suppose ∀θ ≥ θ a , t SB ( m(θ)) = t S (θ), then
• a * <â; and
All things otherwise equal, the option contract generates weaker incentives for the agent. The reason it simply that the downside is bounded; failure does not carry great consequences. For the principal that means that a high action becomes more expensive to implement.
Characterization and properties of the contract
Lemmata 5-7 highlight two sources of distortion in the agent's response: the ability to manipulate information and the shape the transfer function must take to address the limited liability induced by this manipulability. With Lemma 6 the description of the transfer schedule can be completed.
Proposition 2 The optimal transfer function t SB solving Problem 1 it continuous, non-decreasing over Θ and described by Lemma 6; in particular, it:-
• is continuous but with a kink at θ a ;
• is non-decreasing concave for all θ above θ a ; and
This contract accords well with practice, where boni may be observed when a hurdle is passed.
That it pay zero below θ a is a fairly intuitive result. Anything below zero is not binding, as argued before. Anything above zero is too costly: κ needs only satisfy κu ′ (0) = 1. Paying more than zero induces a lower action from the agent because it insures her against failure and it does not improve information revelation. 18 For the next Proposition, consider θ S a the value of θ such that f a (θ)/f (θ) = 0 under the transfer function t S (θ).
Proposition 3 The transfer function t SB is such that
• ∀θ < θ S a , t S < t SB ; and
This result is an implication of Lemmata 5 and 7, which show that all effects work in the direction of lower effort and lower transfers. For the agent, the opportunity to misrepresent one's private information becomes a substitute for effort, and the implicit limited liability constraint introduced by bounded penalties further dampens effort incentives. For the principal both effects render a high action prohibitively expensive. In response the principal weakens the incentives through the transfer; he offers a lower transfer for any message received, up to the zero lower-bound. 
The last result addresses the relationship between audit and ex ante incentives. The audit function p 1 (·) is said to be more precise than 
Proposition 4 Both a SB and t SB increase with the precision of p( m − θ).
So even if auditing never compels truthful revelation, investing in it is
Discussion
The notion of mechanism.
An optimal mechanism consists of a transfer, a message space and a detection probability (or equivalently, an investment α). This paper keeps α fixed for emphasis and ease of exposition without consequences on the central results (Propositions 2 to 4). As long as the (optimal) audit investment α is such that truthful revelation cannot obtain (as this paper purposefully assumes), all the results stand and nothing is learnt from optimizing over α. In a companion paper I show that a high-enough investment α may induce truthful revelation for some (but never all) θ. Regardless, the construction of the separating mechanism remains necessary, for α is endogenous.
The role of penalties.
The paper purposefully departs from optimal penalties because they render the problem separable; 
Monitoring.
Should the principal audit the agent's report of an outcome (θ), or somehow gather information about the action (a) -that is, monitor the agent? In the latter case, the agent is paid according to her action, not the outcome, and the information revelation problem is moot. Khalil and Lawarree (1995) have shown this is not a trivial problem, and that the principal prefers monitoring (observing inputs) when he is the residual claimant -as in this paper. Implicitly here it is presumed that monitoring is either too costly or outright impossible.
Relation to M -implementability (Green and Laffont (1986)).
These authors study the implementability of a social choice function when the agent may report a message from a set M (θ) ⊂ Θ, where M (·) is exogenous and publicly known. The idea is to allow for the agent to report small lies (the set M (θ)) around the true state, and characterise the set of social choice functions that are truthfully implementable. It may sometimes be optimal for the 19 Noting that here truthful revelation would obtain immediately from the exogenous penalty.
principal to not induce truthful revelation. This is clearly a feature of the present paper, where the principal is better off with a contract that allows for reporting outside the type space.
Green and Laffont (1986) provide a necessary and sufficient condition -called the nested range condition (NRC) -for the agent to report her information truthfully. The NRC does not hold in this model, although it corresponds to a game of of "unidirectional distortions with an ordered space"
(to use their words) -example a(2) in Green and Laffont (1986) . Because the agent has a unique optimal deviation for each type, the set M (θ) = {ω|ω ∈ Θ, ω ≥ θ} (to use their notation) collapses to a singleton for each type, whence no nesting condition can possibly hold. This is because Green and Laffont (1986) exogenously allow for the agent's response to be a correspondence, whereas here the agent's optimal message is unique.
Conclusion
When a principal cannot observe the outcome of his agent's action in a moral hazard framework, he faces a problem of ex post adverse selection as well. With few instruments and limited penalties, these problems are not separable. This introduces a fundamental tension between ex ante incentives, for which a contingent transfer is necessary, and ex post incentives, best addressed with a stateindependent transfer.
When adverse selection and moral hazard are not separable, their interaction has significant bearing on the optimal contract. In this paper, not only is a direct mechanism not truthful, it results in partial pooling. Ex post pooling dampens ex ante effort incentives. A contract that induces full separation is preferable and can be constructed with a simple message space. Still, the ex post adverse selection problem is costly to the principal in two ways. First, for a given contract, the agent is always able to exaggerate her actual performance, which generates weaker effort incentives. Second, weak penalties act like a limited liability constraint, which implies that the optimal contract is option-like. Because the downside is limited for the agent, such a contract has poor incentive properties. These results stand in contrast with the current literature (e.g. Mookherjee and Png, 1989; Kanodia 1985) .
For ease of exposition and for emphasis, this paper restricts attention to the case where reporting can never be truthful. From this is follows that the alternative, separating revelation mechanism is always preferable to a direct mechanism. In doing so I have effectively considered only a subset of audit functions p(·|α). The solution to the broader problem -when the principal has access to the full set P of audit technologies and α becomes endogenous, is left for future research. It is also worth noting that the principal's inability to elicit truthful revelation may be a source of externalities in some environment (e.g. financial systems, or situations of common agency). These
questions are yet to explore too.
Appendix: Supplementary material and Proofs
Information revelation
There are in fact three regimes depending on the accuracy of audit p(·; α). For emphasis, this paper deals with the third one only; it is the one where the separating mechanism is important.
Case 1: Truthful revelation. This occurs when Condition (3.2) becomes v
for all values of the private information θ, or when t ′ = 0. Given truthful ex post revelation, the transfer function t(·) and the action a collapse to the standard second-best solutions.
Case 2: Partial truthful revelation. This corresponds to v
and truth-telling obtains aboveθ.
and truth-telling is out of reach belowθ. The converse is true for
Case 3: No truthful revelation. Here Condition (3.2) fails to hold anywhere on the range Θ,
. Then an agent who is induced to exert any effort will necessarily misreport her private information.
Thus Condition (3.2) defines a subset P 0 (t, α) ⊆ P of audit functions that can elicit truthful revelation for at least some values of θ, given a transfer function t(·) and an investment α. The restriction to audit technologies p(·; α) ∈ P \ P 0 (t, α) can be rationalized by conditions on the cost function k(α). This rich array of outcomes obtains because the audit technology is allowed to be imperfect and penalties are bounded, unlike Mookherjee and Png (1989) , for example.
In case 2 there is no need to invoke the separating mechanism constructed in this paper. By concavity of v(t), truthful revelation emerges for someθ and above, so Lemma 3 does not apply.
The problem remains not separable, therefore the same kind of contract with the same properties emerges in equilibrium.
Supplementary material
The next couple of Lemmata will be useful in forthcoming proofs. Recall thatθ is identified by the truth-telling condition (3.2).
Lemma 8 The function
is continuous and differentiable atθ whenθ ∈ (θ, θ)
U is the more general expression of the agent's utility when p(·; α) is allowed to be in P 0 (i.e. Cases 1 and 2). Aboveθ the agent reports truthfully and belowθ not. Because U is smooth atθ it must be (strictly) convex belowθ and up to that point.
Proof: I show that U cannot be discontinuous and that by Condition (3.2) it must be also differentiable. Discontinuity may be a concern only in Case 2, so it is sufficient to restrict attention
to Ω = Θ. Consider some transfer function t(·) defined over Θ. Since only upward deviations are of concern, the trouble is that we may have
Suppose so, then truth-telling cannot be an optimal response atθ. So there must
Let θ →θ, this is exactly the definition of continuity. Now notice that
Hence U is differentiable as well. Condition (3.2) is a pasting condition at θ. From this proof I also derive
From Lemma 8 it follows that
The following is the formal statement that any equilibrium transfer must be strictly positive. 
v(t(ω
for some state θ. Because p(ω − θ) is continuous, one can use the approximation p(ω (θ)) ) and since v(·) and t(·) are monotone increasing, ω(θ) > ω(θ), a contradiction. The same can be shown if taking somê θ < θ and supposing that ω(θ) ≥ ω(θ). It follows that ω(θ, t) is a.e. differentiable, by application of the Theorem of Lebesgue, except at most for a finite set of points. Differentiate (3.1) with respect to θ and rearrange. For the last statement, continuity and monotonicity can be easily shown, so that ω(θ, t) is also a.e. differentiable with respect to t. Fix an arbitrary type such that the firstorder condition (3.1) holds, differentiate it with respect to each of the variables and re-arrange.
Using the fact that the SOC holds the claims follow. The results extend all the way to θ = θ from the right-hand side by (right-hand) continuity and to θ = θ from the left-hand side by (left-hand) continuity.
Proof of Lemma 3:
Take Ω = Θ. For any type θ either FOC (3.1) holds and yields an interior solution ω(θ; t) or as a consequence of Lemma 2, ω(θ; t) = θ. Let θ ′ (t) denote the smallest type for which ω(t; θ) = θ. By Lemma 2 again, type θ is necessarily constrained (i.e. Condition (3.1) is strictly positive.) Moreover, since the conditions in Lemma 2 holds with strict inequality, at least one more type is such that Condition (3.1) is at least weakly positive. Therefore θ ′ (t) < θ. To
is not differentiable w.r.t. ω at θ ′ (t) (the right-hand derivative is zero since ω(t; θ) = θ); but the lefthand derivative is given by (3.1). The second set of statements follows directly from the existence of θ ′ (t) and from Lemma 2. By uniqueness of ω(t, θ) (when the FOC (3.1) binds), we necessarily have θ ′ (t) ̸ = θ ′ (t) whenever t ̸ =t. Since the threshold θ ′ (t) is a monotonic function, it is a.e. differentiable except for a finite set of points (Theorem of Lebesgue). Noting that dω dt < 0 wherever the FOC (3.1) holds, one can apply it to the left-hand derivative dω(t;θ) dt | θ=θ ′ (t) < 0. The claim follows.
Proof of Proposition 1: Existence is immediate by extending s
(and re-labeling the mappings). Given this, the agent's problem changes from
where ω(θ) ∈ Θ solves (3.1), to
where ω(θ) ∈ R solves (3.1). It is immediate that the solution a * to the second problem exceeds that of the first one. It must also be the equilibrium action (i.e.ã = a SB ). Last, because the principal is effort constrained, he always prefers a higher action.
Proof of Lemma 4:
As if proving the Revelation Principle: consider a separating allocation ⟨t(ω(θ)),p(ω(θ) − θ)⟩ obtained through some general mechanism with message space Ω. This allocation is (at least a subset of) the range of an injective map because it is separating. It must also satisfy the agent's optimality condition ω * (θ) = arg max ω∈Ω [ 
which is
exactly as in Condition (3.3). By Lemma 2, the solution m(θ) is unique for each θ; that is, m(θ) is injective, hence separating.
Proof of Lemma 5:
Fix the standard transfer schedule t; by optimality of the message
)dF a by concavity in a. This proves the first item. For the second one, observe that because ∀θ,
( m(θ)) and thus t( m(θ)) > t(θ)
. Now take the first-order condition (4.4), multiply by f and v ′ and differentiate with respect to a :
Divide by v ′ and integrate over Θ : 
. Now substitute the definition of f a in the agent's con-
where F a < 0, so λ > 0 necessarily.
Proof of Proposition 2: Fix a. Rewrite the first-order condition as
) is a continuous function. To show continuity at θ a , recall that λ fa f | θa = 0 and f a /f is continuous in θ, so continuity at θ a follows. To show concavity beyond θ a , first define Local Informativeness condition (see JKS), the zero payment corresponding to the implicit limited liability constraint is "payment binding".
A re-assuring (technical) Corollary follows from the collection of the previous results.
Corollary 3
The optimal message m(θ) is everywhere continuous on Θ; i.e. there are no jumps.
This follows from the fact that the optimal transfer function t SB is monotone concave from θ a on.
There can be no pair θ 1 < θ 2 such that v ′ t ′ (θ 2 ) > v ′ t ′ (θ 1 ). See Footnote 13.
Proof of Lemma 7:
Under the contract characterized in Proposition 2, the agent's first-order condition rewrites 0 + Because the transfer t SB pays 0 whenever m(θ) < θ SB a , the first part of the claim holds as soon as θ SB a > θ S a . To see that it must be so, it is useful to connect to θ a to actions. Define x(a), set f a (x(a)|a)/f (x(a)|a) ≡ 0 and seek the locus dx(a)/da such that f a (x(a)|a)/f (x(a)|a) remains naught. By differentiation,
because f a /f = 0 at x(a). Now,
> 0 by MLRP, so that f ′ a (x(a)) > 0 (because f a /f = 0 at x(a), again). To sign f aa , we know from the agent's moral hazard constraint (either (4.3) or the standard one) that dt/da > 0. Using the definition (4.4) of the transfer function and differentiating with respect to the action: u ′′ (dt/da)(κ + λf a /f ) + (dλ/da)(f a /f ) + λf aa /f = 0, so that f aa > 0 when f a /f = 0. Therefore dx/da < 0, and because the action is lower, the first claim follows. For the second part, apply the proof of Lemma 5 and recall that in equilibrium a * = a SB .
Proof of Proposition 4:
Fix the contract and consider the agent's ex post problem with solution m(θ) given by (3.1). This condition can be rewritten 
